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I THINK, THEREFORE I INVENT: 
CREATIVE COMPUTERS AND THE  
FUTURE OF PATENT LAW 
RYAN ABBOTT* 
Abstract: Artificial intelligence has been generating inventive output for dec-
ades, and now the continued and exponential growth in computing power is 
poised to take creative machines from novelties to major drivers of economic 
growth. In some cases, a computer’s output constitutes patentable subject matter, 
and the computer rather than a person meets the requirements for inventorship. 
Despite this, and despite the fact that the Patent Office has already granted pa-
tents for inventions by computers, the issue of computer inventorship has never 
been explicitly considered by the courts, Congress, or the Patent Office. Drawing 
on dynamic principles of statutory interpretation and taking analogies from the 
copyright context, this Article argues that creative computers should be consid-
ered inventors under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution. Treat-
ing nonhumans as inventors would incentivize the creation of intellectual proper-
ty by encouraging the development of creative computers. This Article also ad-
dresses a host of challenges that would result from computer inventorship, in-
cluding the ownership of computer-based inventions, the displacement of human 
inventors, and the need for consumer protection policies. This analysis applies 
broadly to nonhuman creators of intellectual property, and explains why the 
Copyright Office came to the wrong conclusion with its Human Authorship Re-
quirement. Finally, this Article addresses how computer inventorship provides in-
sight into other areas of patent law. For instance, computers could replace the hy-
pothetical skilled person that courts use to judge inventiveness. Creative comput-
ers may require a rethinking of the baseline standard for inventiveness, and po-
tentially of the entire patent system. 
INTRODUCTION 
 An innovation revolution is on the horizon.1 Artificial intelligence 
(“AI”) has been generating inventive output for decades, and now the contin-
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, Ryan Abbott. All rights reserved. 
 * Professor of Law and Health Sciences, University of Surrey School of Law and Adjunct Assis-
tant Professor, David Geffen School of Medicine at University of California, Los Angeles. Thanks to 
Ian Ayres, Martin Keane, John Koza, Lisa Larrimore-Ouellette, Mark Lemley, and Steven Thaler for 
their insightful comments. 
 1 See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 40 (2013) (predicting that the automation 
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ued and exponential growth in computing power is poised to take creative ma-
chines from novelties to major drivers of economic growth.2 A creative singu-
larity in which computers overtake human inventors as the primary source of 
new discoveries is foreseeable.  
 This phenomenon poses new challenges to the traditional paradigm of 
patentability. Computers already are generating patentable subject matter under 
circumstances in which the computer, rather than a human inventor, meets the 
requirements to qualify as an inventor (a phenomenon that this Article refers to 
as “computational invention”).3 Yet, it is not clear that a computer could be an 
inventor or even that a computer’s invention could be patentable.4 There is no 
statute addressing computational invention, no case law directly on the subject, 
and no pertinent Patent Office policy.5  
These are important issues to resolve. Inventors have ownership rights in 
their patents, and failure to list an inventor can result in a patent being held 
invalid or unenforceable. Moreover, government policies encouraging or inhib-
iting the development of creative machines will play a critical role in the evo-
lution of computer science and the structure of the research and development 
(“R&D”) enterprise.6  Soon computers will be routinely inventing, and it may 
only be a matter of time until computers are responsible for most innovation.  
                                                                                                                           
of knowledge work “could have as much as $5.2 trillion to $6.7 trillion in economic impact annually 
by 2025”). 
 2 See infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 28–99 and accompanying text; see also Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big 
Data and Its Use by Artificial Intelligence, in BIG DATA IS NOT A MONOLITH (Cassidy R. Sugimoto, 
Hamid R. Ekbia & Michael Mattioli eds., forthcoming Oct. 2016) (discussing computational invention 
in an essay originally posted online on February 19, 2015). 
 4 See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative Computer Program: 
Will the True Creator Please Stand Up?, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1675, 1681, 1702–03 (1997) (arguing the 
output of creative computers cannot and should not be protected by federal intellectual property laws 
and that such results enter the public domain); see also Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership 
Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that 
computers cannot be authors because they do not need incentives to generate output). Pamela Samuel-
son, arguing against considering computers to be authors, states that, “[o]nly those stuck in the doctri-
nal mud could even think that computers could be ‘authors.’” Id. at 1200. 
 5 See Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys and Artificial 
Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 44 & n.70 (2015) (noting no pertinent results from “a search 
for patent cases discussing genetic programming or computer-aided drug discovery (perhaps the two 
most common means of computerized inventive activity)” and that “[o]f a sampling of issued patents 
that were conceived wholly or in part by computers, none have ever been subject to litigation.”); see 
also ROBERT PLOTKIN, THE GENIE IN THE MACHINE 60 (2009). “Patent Office” refers to the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), the federal agency responsible for granting patents and 
registering trademarks. See About Us, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/
6HZY-V9NU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2016). 
 6 See generally Michael Kremer & Heidi Williams, Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool 
Kit, 10 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2010) (discussing the importance of intellectual property 
rights for promoting innovation). 
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This Article addresses whether a computer could and should be an inven-
tor for the purposes of patent law as well as whether computational inventions 
could and should be patentable.7 It argues that computers can be inventors be-
cause although AI would not be motivated to invent by the prospect of a pa-
tent, computer inventorship would incentivize the development of creative ma-
chines.8 In turn, this would lead to new scientific advances. 
Beyond inventorship concerns, such machines present fascinating ques-
tions: Are computers thinking entities? Who should own the rights to a com-
puter’s invention? How do animal artists differ from artificial intelligence? 
What would be the societal implications of a world in which most inventions 
were created by computers? Do creative computers challenge established 
norms in other areas of patent law? This Article attempts to resolve these ques-
tions as well as some of the other philosophical, societal, and even apocalyptic 
concerns related to creative computers.9  
This Article is divided into three parts.10 Part I examines instances in 
which AI has created patentable inventions.11 It finds that machines have been 
autonomously generating patentable results for at least twenty years and that 
the pace of such invention is likely increasing.12 It proceeds to discuss the cri-
teria for inventorship and to examine the roles of humans and computers in the 
inventive process. It concludes that statutory language requiring inventors to 
be individuals and judicial characterization of invention as a “mental act” pre-
sent barriers to computer inventorship, but that otherwise computers inde-
pendently meet the requirements for inventorship. Finally, Part I notes that ap-
plicants seem not to be disclosing the role of creative computers to the Patent 
Office—likely as a result of uncertainty over whether a computer inventor 
would render an invention unpatentable. Applicants may also be able to legally 
circumvent such disclosure by being the first human to discover a computer’s 
patentable result, but this Article will discuss how that approach is unfair, inef-
ficient, and logistically problematic. 
Part II examines the jurisprudence related to nonhuman authorship of 
copyrightable material in the absence of law on the subject of computer inven-
torship.13 It discusses the history of the Copyright Office’s Human Authorship 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See infra notes 23–138 and accompanying text.  
 8 See infra notes 139–239 and accompanying text.  
 9 See infra notes 230–313 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 23–138, 139–239, and 240–312 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 23–138 and accompanying text.  
 12 See, e.g., John R. Koza, Human-Competitive Results Produced by Genetic Programming, in 11 
GENETIC PROGRAMMING & EVOLVABLE MACHINES 251, 251 (2010) [hereinafter Koza, Human-
Competitive Results] (“[T]he increased availability of computing power (through both parallel compu-
ting and Moore’s law) should result in the production, in the future, of an increasing flow of human-
competitive results, as well as more intricate and impressive results.”). 
 13 See infra notes 139–239 and accompanying text.  
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Requirement,14 and scrutinizes case law interpreting the Patent and Copyright 
Clause.15 On the basis of this analysis, and based on principles of dynamic 
statutory interpretation,16 it argues that computers should qualify as legal in-
ventors. 
This would incentivize the development of creative machines consistent 
with the purpose and intent of the Founders and Congress. The requirement 
that inventors be individuals was designed to prevent corporate ownership,17 
and so computer inventorship should not be prohibited on this basis. Also, 
there should be no requirement for a mental act because patent law is con-
cerned with the creativity of an invention itself rather than the subjective men-
tal process by which an invention may have been achieved.18 This Part con-
cludes by addressing objections to computer inventorship including arguments 
that computational inventions would develop in the absence of patent protec-
tion at non-monopoly prices. 
Finally, Part III addresses challenges posed by computer inventorship, 
and generalizes the analysis of earlier sections.19 It finds that a computer’s 
owner should be the default assignee of any invention, both because this is 
most consistent with the rules governing ownership of property, and because it 
would most incentivize innovation. Where a computer’s owner, developer, and 
user are different entities, such parties could negotiate alternative arrangements 
by contract. Computer ownership here generally refers to software ownership, 
although there may be instances in which it is difficult to distinguish between 
hardware and software, or even to identify a software “owner.”20 This Part also 
examines the phenomenon of automation and the displacement of human in-
ventors by computers. It finds that computational invention remains beneficial 
despite legitimate concerns and that for the foreseeable future computers are 
likely to refocus human inventors rather than replace them. 
Part IV concludes by finding the arguments in support of computer inven-
torship apply with equal force to nonhuman authors. Allowing animals to cre-
ate copyrightable material would result in more socially valuable art by creat-
ing new incentives for people to facilitate animal creativity.21 It would also 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d 
ed. 2014). 
 15 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
1479 (1987) (identifying principles of dynamic statutory interpretation). 
 17 See infra notes 122–132 and accompanying text. 
 18 See, e.g., The “Flash of Genius” Standard of Patentable Invention, 13 FORDHAM L. REV. 84, 
85–86 (1944). 
 19 See infra notes 240–312 and accompanying text. 
 20 See generally GOVERNMENT OFFICE FOR SCIENCE, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: 
BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN (describing algorithmic technologies and distributed ledgers as examples of 
new and disruptive computational paradigms). 
 21 See infra notes 279–287 and accompanying text. 
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provide incentives for environmental conservation.22 Lastly, this Article exam-
ines some of the implications of computer inventorship for other areas of pa-
tent law. Computers are a natural substitute for the person having ordinary skill 
in the art (“PHOSITA” or, simply, the “skilled person”) used to judge a pa-
tent’s inventiveness. The skilled person is presumed to know of all the prior art 
(what came before an invention) in a particular field—a legal fiction that could 
be accurate in the case of a computer. Substituting a computer for the skilled 
person also suggests a need to expand the scope of prior art, given that com-
puters are not limited by human distinctions of scientific fields. This would 
make it more challenging for inventions to be held nonobvious, particularly in 
the case of inventions that merely combine existing elements in a new configu-
ration (combination patents). That would be a desirable outcome, although the 
new test would create new challenges. 
I. CREATIVE COMPUTERS AND PATENT LAW 
This Part investigates instances when AI has created patentable inven-
tions.23 It finds that machines have been autonomously generating patentable 
results for at least twenty years and that the pace of such invention is likely 
increasing.24 This Part proceeds to discuss the criteria for inventorship and to 
examine the roles of humans and computers in the inventive process.25 It con-
cludes that statutory language requiring inventors to be individuals and judicial 
characterizations of invention as a “mental act” present barriers to computer 
inventorship, but that computers independently meet the requirements for in-
ventorship otherwise.26 Finally, this Part notes that applicants seem not to be 
disclosing the role of creative computers to the Patent Office—likely as a re-
sult of uncertainty over whether a computer inventor would render an inven-
tion unpatentable.27  
A. Computers Independently Generate Patentable Results 
1. Example One: The Creativity Machine 
Computers have been autonomously creating inventions since the twenti-
eth century. In 1994, computer scientist Stephen Thaler disclosed an invention 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 279–287 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 23–138 and accompanying text. 
 24 See, e.g., Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 251 (“[T]he increased availabil-
ity of computing power (through both parallel computing and Moore’s law) should result in the pro-
duction, in the future, of an increasing flow of human-competitive results, as well as more intricate 
and impressive results.”). 
 25 See infra notes 100–121 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 122–132 and accompanying text. 
  27 See infra notes 133–138 and accompanying text. 
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he called the “Creativity Machine,” a computational paradigm that “came the 
closest yet to emulating the fundamental mechanisms responsible for idea for-
mation.”28 The Creativity Machine is able to generate novel ideas through the 
use of a software concept referred to as artificial neural networks—essentially, 
collections of on/off switches that automatically connect themselves to form 
software without human intervention.29  
At its most basic level, the Creativity Machine combines an artificial neu-
ral network that generates output in response to self-stimulation of the net-
work’s connections together with another network that perceives value in the 
stream of output.30 This results in an AI that “brainstorms” new and creative 
ideas after it alters (perturbs) the connections within its neural network.31 An 
example of this phenomenon occurred after Dr. Thaler exposed the Creativity 
Machine to some of his favorite music, and the machine proceeded to write 
eleven thousand new songs in a single weekend.32  
Dr. Thaler compares the Creativity Machine and its processes to the hu-
man brain and consciousness.33 The two artificial neural networks mimic the 
human brain’s major cognitive circuit: the thalamo-cortical loop.34 In a simpli-
fied model of the human brain, the cortex generates a stream of output (or con-
sciousness), and the thalamus brings attention (or awareness) to ideas that are 
of interest.35 Like the human brain, the Creativity Machine is capable of gener-
ating novel patterns of information rather than simply associating patterns, and 
it is capable of adapting to new scenarios without additional human input.36 
Also like the human brain, the AI’s software is not written by human beings—
                                                                                                                           
 28 See What Is the Ultimate Idea?, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., http://www.imagination-engines.
com [https://perma.cc/P877-F33B] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
 29 The architecture for the Creativity Machine is discussed in greater detail in several publica-
tions. See, e.g., Stephen L. Thaler, Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness, 6 INT’L J. MACHINE 
CONSCIOUSNESS 75 (2014) [hereinafter Thaler, Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness]; Stephen 
Thaler, Creativity Machine® Paradigm, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CREATIVITY, INVENTION, INNOVA-
TION, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 451 (Elias G. Carayannis ed., 2013) [hereinafter Thaler, Creativity 
Machine® Paradigm]; S.L. Thaler, A Proposed Symbolism for Network-Implemented Discovery Pro-
cesses, WORLD CONGRESS ON NEURAL NETWORKS ’96, SAN DIEGO 1265 (Int’l Neural Network 
Soc’y 1996) [hereinafter, Thaler, A Proposed Symbolism]. 
 30 See Aaron M. Cohen, Stephen Thaler’s Imagination Machines, THE FUTURIST, July–Aug. 
2009, at 28, 28–29.  
 31 See Thaler, A Proposed Symbolism, supra note 29, at 1265–68. 
 32 See Tina Hesman, Stephen Thaler’s Computer Creativity Machine Simulates the Human 
Brain, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2004, available at http://www.mindfully.org/Technology/
2004/Creativity-Machine-Thaler24jan04.htm [https://perma.cc/T8HS-C2TB]. 
 33 Thaler, Creativity Machine® Paradigm, supra note 29, at 447. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Artificial Neural Networks, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., http://imagination-engines.
com/iei_ann.php [https://perma.cc/BB8K-G3FH] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016); IEI’s Patented Creativity 
Machine® Paradigm, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., http://imagination-engines.com/iei_cm.php 
[https://perma.cc/4A8A-6H3Y] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
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it is self-assembling.37 Dr. Thaler argues his AI is very different from a soft-
ware program that simply generates a spectrum of possible solutions to a prob-
lem combined with an algorithm to filter for the best ideas generated.38 He 
notes that such a software program would be another method for having an AI 
developing novel ideas.39 
Dr. Thaler invented the Creativity Machine, and the machine was the sub-
ject of his first patent, titled “Device for the Autonomous Generation of Useful 
Information.”40 The second patent filed in Dr. Thaler’s name was “Neural 
Network Based Prototyping System and Method.”41 Dr. Thaler is listed as the 
patent’s inventor, but he states that the Creativity Machine invented the pa-
tent’s subject matter (the “Creativity Machine’s Patent”).42 The Creativity Ma-
chine’s Patent application was first filed on January 26, 1996, and granted on 
December 22, 1998.43  
As one of Dr. Thaler’s associates observed in response to the Creativity 
Machine’s Patent, “Patent Number Two was invented by Patent Number One. 
Think about that. Patent Number Two was invented by Patent Number One!”44 
Aside from the Creativity Machine’s Patent, the machine is credited with nu-
merous other inventions: the cross-bristle design of the Oral-B CrossAction 
toothbrush, new super-strong materials, and devices that search the Internet for 
messages from terrorists, among others.45 
The Creativity Machine’s Patent is interesting for a number of reasons. If 
Dr. Thaler’s claims are accurate, then the Patent Office has already granted, 
without knowing it has done so, a patent for an invention created by a non-
human inventor—and as early as 1998. Also, the Patent Office apparently had 
no idea it was doing so. Dr. Thaler listed himself as the inventor on the patent 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Cohen, supra note 29. 
 38 See Telephone Interview with Stephen Thaler, President and CEO, Imagination Engines, Inc. 
(Jan. 10, 2016) [hereinafter Thaler, Telephone Interview]. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See U.S. Patent No. 5,659,666 (filed Oct. 13, 1994). 
 41 See U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (filed May 15, 1998). 
 42 See Patent Listing, IMAGINATION ENGINES INC., http://imagination-engines.com/iei_ip.php 
[https://perma.cc/N79N-NWEF] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
 43 U.S. Patent No. 5,852,815 (filed May 15, 1998). This application is a divisional of application 
with serial number 08/592,767 filed Jan. 26, 1996. This means the patent was invented sometime 
before January 26, 1996. Patent applications require an inventor to actually or constructively possess 
the invention at the time an application is filed to meet enablement and written description require-
ments. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 2164 (9th ed. Rev 7, Nov. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
 44 Hesman, supra note 32 (quoting Rusty Miller). 
 45 Thaler, Creativity Machine® Paradigm, supra note 29, at 451. Table 1 contains a list of Crea-
tivity Machine accomplishments. Id. 
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and did not disclose the Creativity Machine’s involvement to the Patent Office. 
The patent’s prosecution history contains no mention of a computer inventor.46 
2. Example Two: The Invention Machine 
The Creativity Machine has not been the only source of computational 
invention.47 Software modeled after the process of biological evolution, known 
as Genetic Programming (“GP”), has succeeded in independently generating 
patentable results. 48 Evolution is a creative process that relies on a few simple 
processes: “mutation, sexual recombination, and natural selection.”49 GP emu-
lates these same methods digitally to achieve machine intelligence.50 It delivers 
human-competitive intelligence with a minimum amount of human involve-
ment.51 
As early as 1996, GP succeeded in independently generating results that 
were the subject of past patents.52 By 2010, there were at least thirty-one in-
stances in which GP generated a result that duplicated a previously patented 
invention, infringed a previously issued patent, or created a patentable new 
invention.53 In seven of those instances, GP infringed or duplicated the func-
tionality of a twenty-first century invention.54 Some of those inventions were 
on the cutting edge of research in their respective fields.55 In two instances, GP 
may have created patentable new inventions.56 
                                                                                                                           
 46 The file history for this patent is available from a search of the USPTO’s website. Patent Ap-
plication Information Retrieval, USPTO, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair [https://perma.
cc/7PAM-3EG7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2016). Patent applicants have a duty of candor and good faith in 
dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to be 
material to patentability. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2012). Indeed, Dr. Thaler completed an inventor’s oath or 
declaration stating that he disclosed to the Office all information known to be material to patentability 
including the identity of all inventors. See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); MPEP, supra note 43, § 602.01(b) 
(listing the standard for patents filed before September 16, 2012). Such oaths are made under penalty 
of fine or imprisonment, and willful false statements may jeopardize the validity of an application and 
any future patents. 35 U.S.C. § 115; MPEP, supra note 43, § 602.01(a)–(b). 
 47 See generally Jon Rowe & Derek Partridge, Creativity: A Survey of AI Approaches, 7 ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE REV. 43 (1993) (detailing sources of computational inventions). 
 48 Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 265. Alan Turing identified GP as a 
method of creating machine intelligence in his 1950 report Intelligent Machinery. A.M. TURING, IN-
TELLIGENT MACHINERY 18 (1948) (“[T]he genetical or evolutionary search by which a combination 
of genes is looked for, the criterion being the survival value.”). 
 49 John R. Koza et al., Evolving Inventions, SCI. AM., Feb. 2003, at 52. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 255–56, 265. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See Koza et al., Evolving Inventions, supra note 49, at 52. 
 56 Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 265. These two instances are the inventive 
act described in U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002) and JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., GENETIC 
PROGRAMMING IV: ROUTING HUMAN-COMPETITIVE MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 102–04 (2003). 
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The Patent Office granted another patent for a computational invention on 
January 25, 2005.57 That invention was created by the “Invention Machine”—
the moniker for a GP-based AI developed by John Koza.58 Dr. Koza is a com-
puter scientist and pioneer in the field of GP, and he claims the Invention Ma-
chine has created multiple “patentable new invention[s].”59 A 2006 article in 
Popular Science about Dr. Koza and the Invention Machine claimed that the 
AI “has even earned a U.S. patent for developing a system to make factories 
more efficient, one of the first intellectual-property protections ever granted to 
a nonhuman designer.”60 The article refers to a patent titled “Apparatus for 
Improved General-Purpose PID and non-PID Controllers” (the “Invention Ma-
chine’s Patent”).61 The Invention Machine generated the content of the patent 
without human intervention and in a single pass.62 It did so without a database 
of expert knowledge and without any knowledge about existing controllers.63 It 
simply required information about basic components (such as resistors and 
diodes) and specifications for a desired result (performance measures such as 
voltage and frequency).64 With this information, the Invention Machine pro-
ceeded to generate different outputs that were measured for fitness (whether an 
output met performance measures).65 
Once again, the Patent Office seems to have had no idea of the AI’s role 
in the Invention Machine’s Patent.66 The Popular Science article states that Dr. 
Koza did not disclose the Invention Machine’s involvement, and the patent’s 
                                                                                                                           
 57 Jonathon Keats, John Koza Has Built an Invention Machine, POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 18, 2006), 
http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-built-invention-machine [https://web.
archive.org/web/20150218225133/http://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-
built-invention-machine]. 
 58 Dr. Koza was also the inventor of the scratch-off lottery ticket in the 1970s. See Home Page of 
John R. Koza, GENETIC PROGRAMMING, http://www.genetic-programming.com/johnkoza.html 
[https://perma.cc/H77Y-XM4T] (last visited Aug. 8, 2016). 
 59 See Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 265. 
 60 Keats, supra note 57. 
 61 See id; U.S. Patent No. '851 (filed July 12, 2002). Although the article does not specifically 
identify the patent it is referring to, a search of USPTO records reveals only one patent with Dr. Koza 
listed as an inventor and with a grant date of January 25, 2005. In addition, in 2010, Dr. Koza subse-
quently identified the 851 Patent as one of two examples in which GP created a patentable new inven-
tion. See Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 265. 
 62 KOZA ET AL., GENETIC PROGRAMMING IV, supra note 56, at 102–04. 
 63 Telephone Interview with John Koza, President, Genetic Programming Inc. (Jan. 22, 2016) 
[hereinafter Koza, Telephone Interview]. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Thus, the GP algorithm is domain independent. Unlike human inventors who often have exten-
sive knowledge of prior inventions and who proceed to build on earlier work, the GP algorithm gener-
ated a new controller without any reliance on prior art. 
 66 “If the Turing test had been to fool a patent examiner instead of a conversationalist, then Janu-
ary 25, 2005 would have been a date for the history books.” PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGO-
RITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 133–
34 (2015). 
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prosecution history contains no mention of a computer inventor.67 Dr. Koza 
states that his legal counsel advised him at the time that his team should con-
sider themselves inventors despite the fact that “the whole invention was creat-
ed by a computer.”68 
Dr. Koza reports that his agenda in having the Invention Machine recreate 
previously patented results was to prove that computers could be made to solve 
problems automatically.69 He believed that focusing on patentable results 
would produce compelling evidence that computers were producing something 
valuable.70 For that reason, he focused on recreating or inventing patentable 
subject matter that represented significant scientific advances.71 For instance, 
the Invention Machine’s Patent was for an improved version of a landmark 
controller built in 1995.72 
3. Example Three: Watson 
The Creativity Machine and the Invention Machine may be the earliest 
examples of computer inventors, but others exist.73 Moreover, the exponential 
growth in computing power over the past dozen years combined with the in-
creasing sophistication of software should have led to an explosion in the 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Indeed, all three of the inventors on the '851 patent, including Dr. Koza, completed an inven-
tor’s oath or declaration stating that they disclosed to the Office all information known to be material 
to patentability including the identity of all inventors. 
 68 Koza, Telephone Interview, supra note 63. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. Generating these results de novo thus represented a test with an external measure of difficul-
ty, in contrast to other AI researchers who were training computers to complete academic exercises. 
 72 See generally KARL J. ASTROM & TORE HAGGLUND, PID CONTROLLERS: THEORY, DESIGN, 
AND TUNING (2d ed. 1995) (detailing original version of the controller for which the Invention Ma-
chine created an improved, patentable version). 
 73 E.g., Matrix Advanced Solutions used AI to develop a new anticoagulant. See Daniel Riester et 
al., Thrombin Inhibitors Identified by Computer-Assisted Multiparameter Design, 102 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. USA 8597, 8597–602 (2005). Maxygen Inc. used GP to develop a novel Hepatitis C treat-
ment. See Maxygen’s Next-Generation Interferon Alpha Enters Phase Ia Clinical Trial, MAXYGEN (Nov. 
7, 2006), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/maxygens-next-generation-interferon-
alpha-enters-phase-ia-clinical-trial-56073027.html [https://perma.cc/Y9LD-B9EL]. In fact, there is an 
annual competition for computers producing human-competitive results by genetic and evolutionary 
computation. See Humies Awards, SIGEVO-GECCO, http://sig.sigevo.org/index.html/tiki-index.php?
page=Humies+Awards [https://perma.cc/XMG2-DAGY] (last visited Aug. 9, 2016). Dr. Koza states that 
competition participants have gone on to patent their results. Koza, Telephone Interview, supra note 63. 
For additional examples of “Artificial Inventions,” see Plotkin, supra note 5, at 61. In his book, Dr. Plot-
kin uses the metaphor of a genie to argue that AI will change the dynamics of human-computer collabo-
rations. He suggests that humans will write “wishes” (an abstract description of a machine or a set of 
instructions for creating a machine) for AI to “grant” (by producing the design for a machine or an actual 
machine). He further argues that fear of invention automation is unnecessary, and that individuals will 
become more sophisticated at “writing wishes” (defining problems) for AI to solve. He suggests this will 
result in more skilled inventors and non-inventors becoming inventors with the help of machines. Id. at 
1–11. 
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number of computational inventions.74 Indeed, it is likely that computers are 
inventing more than ever before.75 Consider, for instance, the results produced 
by IBM’s AI “Watson” of Jeopardy! fame.76 Watson is a computer system de-
veloped by IBM to compete on the game show Jeopardy!77 In 2011, it beat 
former Jeopardy! winners Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter on the show, earning 
a million dollars in the process.78 
IBM describes Watson as one of a new generation of machines capable of 
“computational creativity.”79 IBM uses that term to describe machines that can 
generate “ideas the world has never imagined before.”80 Watson “generates 
millions of ideas out of the quintillions of possibilities, and then predicts which 
ones are [best], applying big data in new ways.”81 This is a fundamentally dif-
ferent type of AI than the Creativity Machine or the Invention Machine; Wat-
son utilizes a more conventional architecture of logical deduction combined 
with access to massive databases containing accumulated human knowledge 
and expertise.82 Although Watson is not modeled after the human brain or evo-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See, e.g., 50 Years of Moore’s Law, INTEL, http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-
innovations/moores-law-technology.html [https://perma.cc/PMN9-XJ2L] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
In 1965, Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel and Fairchild Semiconductor, published a paper in which 
he noted a doubling every year in the number of components in an integrated circuit. Based on this 
and his subsequent observations, “Moore’s Law” became the “golden rule for the electronics indus-
try,” predicting that overall processing power for computers will double every eighteen months. See 
id. 
 75 See, e.g., Koza, Human-Competitive Results, supra note 12, at 251 (stating that “the increased 
availability of computing power (through both parallel computing and Moore’s Law) should result in 
the production, in the future, of an increasing flow of human-competitive results, as well as more 
intricate and impressive results”). 
 76 See Jo Best, IBM Watson, TECHREPUBLIC, http://www.techrepublic.com/article/ibm-watson-the-
inside-story-of-how-the-jeopardy-winning-supercomputer-was-born-and-what-it-wants-to-do-next/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ4V-Q48F] (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See Computational Creativity, IBM, http://www.research.ibm.com/cognitive-computing/
computational-creativity.shtml#fbid=kwG0oXrjBHY [https://perma.cc/6FK4-WTL3] (last visited Jan. 
25, 2016). 
 80 What Is Watson?, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/what-is-watson.
html [https://perma.cc/8KM3-LLSG] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). Watson is a cognitive commuting 
system with the extraordinary ability to analyze natural language processing, generate and evaluate 
hypotheses based on the available data then store and learn from the information. In other words, 
Watson essentially mirrors the human learning process by getting “smarter [through] tracking feed-
back from its users and learning from both successes and failures.” Id. Watson made its notable debut 
on the game show Jeopardy, where it defeated Brad Rutter and Ken Jennings using only stored data 
by comparing potential answers and ranking confidence in accuracy at the rate of approximately three 
seconds per question. Id. 
 81 Computational Creativity, supra note 79. 
 82 See, e.g., David Ferrucci et al., Building Watson: An Overview of the DeepQA Project, AI 
MAG., Fall 2010, at 59, 68–69; IBM Watson: Beyond Jeopardy! Q&A, ACM, http://learning.acm.
org/webinar/lally.cfm [https://perma.cc/JA3N-J6HG] (last visited Jan. 25, 2016). 
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lutionary processes, it is also capable of generating novel, nonobvious, and 
useful ideas. 
Watson’s Jeopardy! career was short and sweet, and by 2014, it was being 
applied to more pragmatic challenges, such as running a food truck.83 IBM 
developed new algorithms for Watson and incorporated a database with infor-
mation about nutrition, flavor compounds, the molecular structure of foods, 
and tens of thousands of existing recipes.84 This new design permits Watson to 
generate recipes in response to users inputting a few parameters such as ingre-
dients, dish (e.g., burgers or burritos), and style (e.g., British or dairy-free).85 
On the basis of this user input, Watson proceeds to generate a staggeringly 
large number of potential food combinations.86 It then evaluates these prelimi-
nary results based on novelty and predicted quality to generate a final output.87 
It is likely that some of Watson’s discoveries in food science are patenta-
ble.88 Patents may be granted for any “new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement there-
of.”89 Food recipes can qualify as patentable subject matter on this basis be-
cause lists of ingredients combine to form new compositions of matter or man-
ufacture and the steps involved in creating food may be considered a process.90 
To be patentable, however, an invention must not only contain patentable sub-
ject matter; it must also be novel, nonobvious, and useful.91 That may be chal-
lenging to achieve in the case of food recipes given that there is a finite num-
ber of ingredients and people have been combining ingredients together for a 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Maanvi Singh, Our Supercomputer Overlord Is Now Running a Food Truck, NPR (Mar. 4, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2014/03/03/285326611/our-supercomputer-overlord-is-now-
running-a-food-truck [https://perma.cc/V7KM-X8P5]; Chef Watson, IBM, https://www.ibmchef
watson.com/community [https://perma.cc/2D54-UURY] (last visited Jan. 17, 2016); Under the Hood, 
IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/cognitivecooking/tech.html [https://perma.cc/HWQ8-
SEFE] (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
 84 See Under the Hood, supra note 83. 
 85 See Watson Cooks Up Computational Creativity, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/
us/en/innovation_explanations/article/florian_pinel.html [https://perma.cc/GGV7-NHT4] (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2016). 
 86 See id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Can Recipes Be Patented?, INVENTORS EYE (June 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/
inventors/independent/eye/201306/ADVICE.jsp [https://perma.cc/EN3V-9DY4]; see also Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308– 09 (1980) (noting that patentable subject matter “include[s] any-
thing under the sun that is made by man” (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 
82-1923, at 6 (1952))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). 
 90 See Can Recipes Be Patented?, supra note 88. 
 91 See General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/general-information-concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/J88J-YUVA] (Oct. 2014). 
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very long time.92 Not only would Watson have to create a recipe that no one 
had previously created, but it could not be an obvious variation on an existing 
recipe. Still, people do obtain patents on new food recipes.93 The fact that 
some of Watson’s results have been surprising to its developers and to human 
chefs is encouraging94 in this regard95 because unexpected results are one of 
the factors considered in determining whether an invention is nonobvious.96 
Watson is not limited to competing on Jeopardy! or to developing new 
food recipes.97 IBM has made Watson broadly available to software applica-
tion providers, enabling them to create services with Watson’s capabilities.98 
Watson is now assisting with financial planning, helping clinicians to develop 
treatment plans for cancer patients, identifying potential research study partici-
pants, distinguishing genetic profiles that might respond well to certain drugs, 
and acting as a personal travel concierge.99 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Therese Oneill, 7 of the World’s Oldest Foods Discovered by Archeologists, MENTAL 
FLOSS (Oct. 8, 2015), http://mentalfloss.com/article/49610/7-world%E2%80%99s-oldest-food-finds 
[https://perma.cc/Y9C5-DRGP]. 
 93 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,354,134 (filed Dec. 22, 2005). 
 94 Which is not to say that patents on recipes are a social good. See generally KAL RAUSTIALA & 
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) 
(discussing social ills that can arise from patents). 
 95 See, e.g., Rochelle Bilow, How IBM’s Chef Watson Actually Works, BON APPÉTIT (June 30, 
2014), http://www.bonappetit.com/entertaining-style/trends-news/article/how-ibm-chef-watson-works 
[https://perma.cc/5UAB-VAGW]. 
 96 MPEP, supra note 43, § 716.02(a). 
 97 IBM has even worked with food magazine Bon Appétit to develop a recipe app called Chef 
Watson to allow the general public to enlist Watson’s help in making new recipes. Rochelle Bilow, 
We Spent a Year Cooking with the World’s Smartest Computer—and Now You Can, Too, BON AP-
PÉTIT (June 23, 2015), http://www.bonappetit.com/entertaining-style/trends-news/article/chef-watson-
app [https://perma.cc/HF7Q-C9FM]. Chef Watson can be accessed online at https://www.ibmchef
watson.com/community [https://perma.cc/2D54-UURY]. For the less technologically inclined who 
still wish to sample machine cooking, IBM has published a book of Watson’s recipes. See generally 
IBM & THE INST. OF CULINARY EDUC., COGNITIVE COOKING WITH CHEF WATSON: RECIPES FOR 
INNOVATION FROM IBM & THE INSTITUTE OF CULINARY EDUCATION (2015) (detailing recipes creat-
ed by Watson). 
 98 Watson Cooks Up Computational Creativity, supra note 85. 
 99 Anna Edney, Doctor Watson Will See You Now, if IBM Wins in Congress, BLOOMBERG BNA 
HEALTH IT LAW & INDUSTRY REPORT (Jan. 29, 2015), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/
frontpage/2015/01/29/Doctor-Watson-will-see-you-now-if-IBM-wins-in-Congress/stories/201501290332 
[https://perma.cc/4BHU-VJXU]; Thor Olavsrud, 10 IBM Watson-Powered Apps That Are Changing Our 
World, CIO (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.cio.com/article/2843710/big-data/10-ibm-watson-powered-apps-
that-are-changing-our-world.html#slide11 [https://perma.cc/NPY7-DDMA]. 
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B. Human and Computer Involvement in Computational Inventions 
1. Requirements for Inventorship 
All patent applications require one or more named inventors who must be 
“individuals,” a legal entity such as a corporation cannot be an inventor.100 In-
ventors own their patents as a form of personal property that they may transfer 
by “assignment” of their rights to another entity.101 A patent grants its owner 
“the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States.”102 If a patent has multiple owners, each owner may inde-
pendently exploit the patent without the consent of the others (absent a con-
flicting contractual obligation).103 This makes the issue of whether a computer 
can be an inventor one of practical as well as theoretical interest because in-
ventors have ownership rights in their patents, and failure to list an inventor 
can result in a patent being held invalid or unenforceable.104 
For a person to be an inventor, the person must contribute to an inven-
tion’s “conception.”105 Conception refers to, “the formation in the mind of the 
inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative inven-
tion as it is thereafter to be applied in practice.”106 It is “the complete perfor-
                                                                                                                           
 100 See 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (1952) “The term ‘inventor’ means the individual or, if a joint inven-
tion, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” See 
id. The same issues surrounding computer inventorship may not exist outside of the U.S. where appli-
cations do not require a named inventor. See MPEP, supra note 43, § 2137.01 (“The requirement that 
the applicant for a patent in an application filed before September 16, 2012 be the inventor(s) . . . and 
that the inventor . . . be identified in applications filed on or after September 16, 2012, are characteris-
tics of U.S. patent law not generally shared by other countries.”). For example, a patent application at 
the European Patent Office may be filed by “any body equivalent to a legal person by virtue of the law 
governing it.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 58, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. 
Under the U.S. Patent Act, only individuals can invent, not corporations. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 115–116. 
 101 See MPEP, supra note 43, § 300. About ninety-three percent of patents are assigned to organi-
zations (rather than individuals). See Patenting by Organizations (Utility Patents), USPTO, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_13.htm#PartA1_1b [https://perma.cc/VF56-GFVT] 
(last modified Jan. 25, 2016). For example, it is common for scientific and technical workers to 
preemptively assign their patent rights to employers as a condition of employment. Most, but not all, 
inventions can be placed under an obligation of assignment in employment contracts. For example, in 
California, employees are permitted to retain ownership of inventions that are developed entirely on 
their own time without using their employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities, or trade secret infor-
mation except for inventions that either: related, at the time of conception or reduction to practice of 
the invention, to the employer’s business;  actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development 
of the employer; or resulted from any work performed by the employee for the employer. CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 2872(a) (West 1979). 
 102 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
 103 See MPEP, supra note 43, § 2137. 
 104 See, e.g., Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 829 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 105 MPEP, supra note 43, § 2137.01(II). 
 106 Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929). 
2016] Patent Generating Artificial Intelligence 1093 
mance of the mental part of the inventive act.”107 After conception, someone 
with ordinary skill in the invention’s subject matter (e.g., a chemist if the in-
vention is a new chemical compound) should be able to “reduce the invention 
to practice.”108 That is to say, they should be able to make and use an invention 
from a description without extensive experimentation or additional inventive 
skill.109 Individuals who simply reduce an invention to practice, by describing 
an already conceived invention in writing or by building a working model 
from a description for example, do not qualify as inventors.110 
2. The Role of Computers in Inventive Activity 
The requirement that an inventor participate in the conception of an in-
vention creates barriers to inventorship for computers as well as people. Alt-
hough computers are commonly involved in the inventive process, in most 
cases, computers are essentially working as sophisticated (or not-so-
sophisticated) tools.  One example occurs  when a computer is functioning as a 
calculator or storing information. In these instances, a computer may assist a 
human inventor to reduce an invention to practice, but the computer is not par-
ticipating in the invention’s conception. Even when computers play a more 
substantive role in the inventive process, such as by analyzing data in an auto-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. 
 108 Reduction to practice refers to either actual reduction—where it can be demonstrated the 
claimed invention works for its intended purpose (for example, with a working model)—or to con-
structive reduction—where an invention is described in writing in such a way that it teaches a person 
of ordinary skill in the subject matter to make and use the invention (as in a patent application). See In 
re Hardee, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1122, 1123 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks Apr. 3, 1984); see also Bd. of 
Educ. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Fla. State Univ. v. Am. Bioscience, Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (“Invention requires conception.”). With regard to the inventorship of chemical compounds, an 
inventor must have a conception of the specific compounds being claimed. See Am. Bioscience, 333 
F.3d at 1340 (“[G]eneral knowledge regarding the anticipated biological properties of groups of com-
plex chemical compounds is insufficient to confer inventorship status with respect to specifically 
claimed compounds.”); see also Ex parte Smernoff, 215 U.S.P.Q 545, 547 (Pat. & Tr. Office Bd.App. 
Aug. 17,1982) (“[O]ne who suggests an idea of a result to be accomplished, rather than the means of 
accomplishing it, is not a coinventor.”). Actual reduction to practice “requires that the claimed inven-
tion work for its intended purpose.” Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 532, 584 (1995) 
(quotations omitted) (quoting Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). Constructive reduction to practice “occurs upon the filing of a patent application on 
the claimed invention.” Id. The written description requirement is “to ensure that the inventor had 
possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed 
by him.” Application of Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 109 “[C]onception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one 
skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the exercise of extensive experimentation or the exer-
cise of inventive skill.” Hiatt v. Ziegler & Kilgour , 179 U.S.P.Q. 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Interferences 
Apr. 3, 1973). Conception has been defined as a disclosure of an idea that allows a person skilled in 
the art to reduce the idea to a practical form without “exercise of the inventive faculty.” Gunter v. 
Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 79 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
 110 See De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1507, 1510 (Bd.Pat.App.& Interferences. Feb. 
22, 1990). 
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mated fashion, retrieving stored knowledge, or by recognizing patterns of in-
formation, the computer still may fail to contribute to conception. Computer 
involvement might be conceptualized on a spectrum: on one end, a computer is 
simply a tool assisting a human inventor; on the other end, the computer inde-
pendently meets the requirements for inventorship. AI capable of acting auton-
omously such as the Creativity Machine and the Invention Machine fall on the 
latter end of the spectrum. 
3. The Role of Humans in Inventive Activity 
Just as computers can be involved in the inventive process without con-
tributing to conception, so can humans. For now, at least, computers do not 
entirely undertake tasks on their own accord. Computers require some amount 
of human input to generate creative output. 
For example, before the Creativity Machine composed music, Dr. Thaler 
exposed it to existing music and instructed it to create something new.111 Yet, 
simply providing a computer with a task and starting materials would not make 
a human an inventor.112 Imagine Friend A tells Friend B, who is an engineer, 
that A would like B to develop an iPhone battery with twice the standard bat-
tery life and A gives B some publically available battery schematics.  If B then 
succeeds in developing such a battery, A would not qualify as an inventor of 
the battery by virtue of having instructed B to create a result.113 This scenario 
essentially occurred in the case of the Creativity Machine’s toothbrush inven-
tion: Dr. Thaler provided the Creativity Machine information on existing 
toothbrush designs along with data on each brush’s effectiveness.114 Solely 
from this information, the Creativity Machine produced the first ever crossed-
bristle design.115 This does not make Dr. Thaler an inventor. In the case of the 
Creativity Machine, the creative act is the result of random or chaotic perturba-
tions in the machine’s existing connections that produce new results which, in 
turn, are judged by the machine for value.116 
Humans are also necessarily involved in the creative process because 
computers do not arise from a void; in other words, humans have to create 
computers.117 Once again, that should not prevent computer inventorship. No 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Thaler, Telephone Interview, supra note 38. 
 112 Ex parte Smernoff, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 547 (“[O]ne who suggests an idea of a result to be accom-
plished, rather than the means of accomplishing it, is not a coinventor.”). 
 113 See id. 
 114 Thaler, Telephone Interview, supra note 38. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Thaler, Creativity Machine® Paradigm, supra note 29, at 449. 
 117 This will be the case until computers start designing other computers or engaging in reflection. 
Reflection is a software concept that refers to a computer program that can examine itself and modify 
its own behavior (and even its own code). J. Malenfant et al., A Tutorial on Behavioral Reflection and 
Its Implementation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE REFLECTION 1, 1–
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one would exist without their parents contributing to their conception (pun in-
tended), but that does not make parents inventors on their child’s patents. If a 
computer scientist creates an AI to autonomously develop useful information 
and the AI creates a patentable result in an area not foreseen by the inventor, 
there would be no reason for the scientist to qualify as an inventor on the AI’s 
result. An inventor must have formed a “definite and permanent idea of the 
complete and operative invention” to establish conception.118 The scientist 
might have a claim to inventorship if he developed the AI to solve a particular 
problem, and it was foreseeable that the AI would produce a particular re-
sult.119 
4. Combining Human and Computer Creativity 
A computer may not be a sole inventor; the inventive process can be a 
collaborative process between human and machine. If the process of develop-
ing the Creativity Machine’s Patent had been a back-and-forth process with 
both the AI and Dr. Thaler contributing to conception, then both might qualify 
as inventors.120 By means of illustration, suppose a human engineer provides a 
machine with basic information and a task. The engineer might learn from the 
machine’s initial output, then alter the information that he or she provides to 
the machine to improve its subsequent output. After several iterations, the ma-
chine might produce a final output that the human engineer might directly alter 
to create a patentable result. In such a case, both the engineer and the machine 
might have played a role in conception. Leaving AI aside, invention is rarely 
occurs in a vacuum, and there are often joint inventors on patents.121 In some 
of these instances, if a computer were human, it would be an inventor. Yet, 
computers are not human, and, as such, they face unique barriers to qualifying 
as inventors. 
                                                                                                                           
20 (1996), available at http://www2.parc.com/csl/groups/sda/projects/reflection96/docs/malenfant/
malenfant.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EKK-7BJT]. 
 118 Townsend, 36 F.2d at 295. 
 119 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 1569 (2009) (discussing foreseeability in the patent context). 
 120 What is required is some “quantum of collaboration or connection.” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. 
Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For joint inventorship, “there 
must be some element of joint behavior, such as collaboration or working under common direction, 
one inventor seeing a relevant report and building upon it or hearing another’s suggestion at a meet-
ing.” Id.; see also Moler & Adams v. Purdy, 131 U.S.P.Q. 276, 279 (Bd. Pat. Interferences 1960) 
(“[I]t is not necessary that the inventive concept come to both [joint inventors] at the same time.”). 
 121 See Prerna Wardhan & Padmavati Manchikanti, A Relook at Inventors’ Rights, 18 J. INTELL. 
PROP. RIGHTS 168, 169 (2013). 
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C. Barriers to Computer Inventorship 
1. The Legal Landscape 
Congress is empowered to grant patents on the basis of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause of the Constitution.122 That clause enables Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”123 It also provides an explicit rationale for granting patent and 
copyright protection, namely to encourage innovation under an incentive theo-
ry.124 The theory goes that people will be more inclined to invent things (i.e., 
promote the progress of science) if they can receive government-sanctioned 
monopolies (i.e., patents) to exploit commercial embodiments of their inven-
tions. Having the exclusive right to sell an invention can be tremendously lu-
crative.125 
The Patent Act, which here refers to United States patent law as a whole, 
provides at least a couple of challenges to computers qualifying as inventors 
under the Patent and Copyright Clause.126 First, as previously mentioned, the 
Patent Act requires that inventors be “individuals.”127 This language has been 
in place since at least the passage of legislation in 1952 that established the 
basic structure of modern patent law.128 The “individual” requirement likely 
was included to reflect the constitutional language that specifically gives “in-
                                                                                                                           
 122 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is also sometimes referred to as the “Patent Clause” 
or the “Copyright Clause.” 
 123 Id. 
 124 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“The standard justification for intellectual property is ex ante . . . . It is 
the prospect of the intellectual property right that spurs creative incentives.”). 
 125 See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLI-
CATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 563 (Prometheus Books 2004) (1872) (noting that under a patent 
system, “the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward”). 
 126 Legislation pertaining to patents is found under Title 35 of the United States Code. The Patent 
Act may also be used to refer to specific pieces of legislation ranging from the Patent Act of 1790, the 
first patent law passed by the federal government, to the Patent Act of 1952. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 
Stat. 792 (1952). 
 127 E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (“The term ‘inventor’ means the individual or, if a joint invention, the 
individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.”). The same 
issues surrounding computer inventorship may not exist outside of the U.S. where applications do not 
require a named inventor. See MPEP, supra note 43, § 2137.01 (“The requirement that the applicant 
for a patent in an application filed before September 16, 2012 be the inventor(s), . . . and that the in-
ventor . . . be identified in applications filed on or after September 16, 2012, are characteristics of U.S. 
patent law not generally shared by other countries.”). For example, a patent application at the Europe-
an Patent Office may be filed by “any body equivalent to a legal person by virtue of the law governing 
it.” Convention on the Grant of European Patents, supra note 100, at art. 58; see also 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 115–116. 
 128 Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952); see also Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 881, 889 (2015) (discussing aims of 1952 Patent Act). 
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ventors” the right to their discoveries as opposed to other legal entities that 
might assert ownership rights.129 Such language would help to ensure that pa-
tent rights were more likely to go to individual inventors than to corporate enti-
ties where ownership was disputed.130 Legislators were not thinking about 
computational inventions in 1952.131 Second, patent law jurisprudence requires 
that inventions be the result of a “mental act.”132 So, because computers are not 
individuals and it is questionable that they engage in a mental act, it is unclear 
whether a computer autonomously conceiving of a patentable invention could 
legally be an inventor. 
2. Avoiding Disclosure of Artificially Intelligent Inventors 
Given that computers are functioning as inventors, and likely inventing at 
an escalating rate, it would seem that the Patent Office should be receiving an 
increasing number of applications claiming computers as inventors. That the 
Patent Office has not suggests that applicants are choosing not to disclose the 
role of AI in the inventive process.133 That may be due to legal uncertainties 
about whether an AI inventor would render an invention unpatentable.134 
                                                                                                                           
 129 In the words of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “people conceive, 
not companies.” New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 130 Now under the America Invents Act (“AIA”), a corporate entity can apply for a patent on 
behalf of an inventor who is under an assignment obligation. MPEP, supra note 43, § 325. 
 131 See Karl F. Milde, Jr., Can a Computer Be an “Author” or an “Inventor”?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 378, 379 (1969). As one commentator notes: 
The closest that the Patent Statute comes to requiring that a patentee be an actual person 
is in the use, in Section 101, of the term “whoever.” Here too, it is clear from the ab-
sence of any further qualifying statements that the Congress, in considering the statute 
in 1952, simply overlooked the possibility that a machine could ever become an inven-
tor. 
Id.; see also, e.g., A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence,  59 MIND 433, 433–51 (1950) 
[hereinafter Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence].  
 132 Conception has been defined as “the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive 
art,” and it is “the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the com-
plete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice.” Townsend, 36 F.2d at 295. 
 133 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The discussion in note 5 infers that the Patent Office 
has not received applications claiming computers as inventors because they have no policy or guid-
ance on the subject, they do not seem to have ever addressed the issue in any publication, and because 
computer inventorship does not seem to have been at issue in any patent litigation. 
 134 See, e.g., Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-imals: Should Copyright Protect Sentient Nonhu-
man Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 23 (2008) (quoting one Copyright Office employee who explained 
that “[as] a practical matter[,] the Copyright Office would not register [a computer’s own] work if its 
origins were accurately represented on the copyright application. The computer program itself would 
be registerable if it met the normal standards for computer programs, but not the computer-generated 
literary work.”) Despite this policy and the Copyright Office’s Compendium guidelines, numerous 
computer-authored works have been registered. See, e.g.,William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-
Composed Music: Hal Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 281, 283 (2004) (noting 
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Without a legal inventor, new inventions would not be eligible for patent pro-
tection and would enter the public domain after being disclosed.135 
There is another reason why computers might not be acknowledged: a 
person can qualify as an inventor simply by being the first individual to recog-
nize and appreciate an existing invention.136 That is to say, someone can dis-
cover rather than create an invention. Uncertainty (and accident) is often part 
of the inventive process.137 In such cases, an individual need only understand 
the importance of an invention to qualify as its inventor.138 For the purposes of 
this Article, assuming that a computer cannot be an inventor, individuals who 
subsequently “discover” computational inventions by mentally recognizing 
and appreciating their significance would likely qualify as inventors. So, it 
may be the case that computational inventions are only patentable when an 
individual subsequently discovers them. 
II. IN SUPPORT OF COMPUTER INVENTORS 
This Part examines the law regarding non-human authorship of copy-
rightable material.139 It discusses the history of the Copyright Office’s Human 
Authorship Requirement.140 This Part also scrutinizes case law interpreting the 
Patent and Copyright Clause.141 On the basis of this analysis and principles of 
dynamic statutory interpretation, this Part argues that computers should qualify 
as legal inventors.142 This would incentivize the development of creative ma-
                                                                                                                           
one computer-authored volume of poetry registered to a computer author, “Racter,” but still not ex-
plicitly disclosed to be a computer). In 1993, Scott French programmed a computer to write in the 
style of a famous author, and the resulting work was registered as an “original and computer aided 
text.” Tal Vigderson, Comment, Hamlet II: The Sequel? The Rights of Authors vs. Computer-
Generated “Read-Alike” Works, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (1994). The novel was apparently 
terrible. See Patricia Holt, Sunday Review, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 15, 1993, B4 (“[t]he result is a mitigat-
ed disaster”). 
 135 See MPEP, supra note 43, § 2137. 
 136 Conception requires contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the invention. See Invi-
trogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the inventor 
must have actually made the invention and understood the invention to have the features that comprise 
the inventive subject matter at issue); see also, e.g., Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 597 (C.C.P.A. 
1974) (“[A]n accidental and unappreciated duplication of an invention does not defeat the patent right 
of one who, though later in time, was the first to recognize that which constitutes the inventive subject 
matter.”). 
 137 For instance, Alexander Fleming discovered penicillin in a mold that had contaminated his sam-
ples of Staphylococcus. Howard Markel, The Real Story Behind Penicillin, PBS (Sep. 27, 2013), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/the-real-story-behind-the-worlds-first-antibiotic/ [https://perma.
cc/V6SM-2QJL]. 
 138 See Silvestri, 496 F.2d at 597. 
 139 See infra notes 139–239 and accompanying text.  
 140 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 14, § 306. 
 141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 142 See generally Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 16 (discussing canons of 
statutory interpretation). 
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chines consistent with the purpose and intent of the Founders and Congress. 
The requirement that inventors be individuals was designed to prevent corpo-
rate ownership, and, therefore, computer inventorship should not be prohibited 
on this basis.143 Also, there should be no requirement for a mental act because 
patent law is concerned with the nature of an invention itself rather than the 
subjective mental process by which an invention may have been achieved.144 
This Part concludes by addressing objections to computer inventorship includ-
ing arguments that computational inventions would develop in the absence of 
patent protection at non-monopoly prices.145 
A. Nonhuman Authors of Copyrightable Material 
The Patent Act does not directly address the issue of a computer inventor. 
The Patent Office has never issued guidance addressing the subject, and there 
appears to be no case law on the issue of whether a computer could be an in-
ventor. That is the case despite the fact that the Patent Office appears to have 
already granted patents for inventions by computers but, as previously dis-
cussed, did so unknowingly. 
There is, however, guidance available from the related issue of nonhuman 
authorship of copyrightable works.146 Nonhuman authorship is not governed 
by statute, but there is interesting case law on the subject. Also, since at least 
1984 the Copyright Office has conditioned copyright registration on human 
authorship.147 In its 2014 compendium, the Copyright Office published an up-
dated “Human Authorship Requirement” which states that:  
To qualify as a work of “authorship” a work must be created by a 
human being. . . . The Office will not register works produced by 
nature, animals, or plants. . . . Similarly, the Office will not register 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See infra notes 206–208 and accompanying text. 
 144 See, e.g., The “Flash of Genius” Standard of Patentable Invention, supra note 18, at 86. 
 145 See notes 189–239 and accompanying text. 
 146 The issue of computer authorship (and inventorship) has been considered “since the 1960s 
when people began thinking about the impact of computers on copyright.” Arthur R. Miller, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything 
New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977, 1043 (1993). Most of the literature related to computer 
generated works has focused on copyright rather than patent protection. “In the secondary literature on 
copyright, rivers of ink are spilt on” whether computers can be considered authors. MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.01[A] (LexisNexis 2015). 
 147 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 14, § 202.02(b). The Com-
pendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices elaborates on the “human authorship” requirement by 
stating: “The term ‘authorship’ implies that, for a work to be copyrightable, it must owe its origin to a 
human being. Materials produced solely by nature, by plants, or by animals are not copyrightable.” Id. 
It further elaborates on the phrase “[w]orks not originated by a human author” by stating: “In order to 
be entitled to copyright registration, a work must be the product of human authorship. Works pro-
duced by mechanical processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are 
not registrable.” Id. § 503.03(a). 
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works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that op-
erates randomly or automatically without any creative input or in-
tervention from a human author.148 
This policy was the result of many years of debate within the Copyright Of-
fice.149 
The requirement is based on jurisprudence that dates long before the in-
vention of modern computers to the In re Trade-Mark Cases in 1879, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Patent and Copyright Clause to exclude 
the power to regulate trademarks.150 In interpreting this clause, the Court stat-
ed, in dicta, that the term “writings” may be construed liberally but noted that 
only writings that are “original, and are founded in the creative powers of the 
mind” may be protected.151 
The issue of computer authorship was implicit in the Court’s celebrated 
case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony in 1884.152 In that case, a 
lithographic company argued that a photograph of Oscar Wilde did not qualify 
as a “writing” or as the work of an “author.”153 The company further argued 
that even if a visual work could be copyrighted, that a photograph should not 
qualify for protection because it was just a mechanical reproduction of a natu-
ral phenomenon and thus could not embody the intellectual conception of its 
author.154 The Court disagreed, noting that all forms of writing “by which the 
ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression” were eligible for 
copyright protection.155 The Court stated that although ordinary photographs 
might not embody an author’s “idea,” in this particular instance, the photogra-
pher had exercised enough control over the subject matter that it qualified as 
an original work of art.156 Therefore, the case explicitly addressed whether the 
camera’s involvement negated human authorship, and it implicitly dealt with 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. § 313.2. 
 149 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, EIGHTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS 18 (1979) (discussing issues related to computer authorship). 
 150 See generally In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (finding that the Patent and Copy-
right Clause excludes regulating trademarks). Congress, which does indeed enjoy the ability to regu-
late trademarks, passed the Trade Mark Act of 1881 two years after this case was decided. That Act 
gave Congress the authority to regulate trademarks on the basis of the Commerce Clause. 
 151 Id. at 94. The Court in this case held that only original works of art, which are the “fruits of 
intellectual labor,” may be protected under copyright law. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
 152 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 58–59. 
 155 Id. at 58. 
 156 Id. at 54–55. Protections for all photographs was eventually made a part of the statutory 
scheme for copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). In the words of Judge Learned Hand, “no 
photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two 
will be absolutely alike.” Jewelers’ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934 
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). 
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the question of whether a camera could be considered an author. Though it 
seems unwise to put much emphasis on dicta from more than a century ago to 
resolve the question of whether nonhumans could be authors, the Copyright 
Office cites Burrow-Giles in support of its Human Authorship Requirement.157 
The Copyright Office first addressed the issue of computer authors in 
1966 when the Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, questioned 
whether computer-generated works should be copyrightable.158 Mr. Kamin-
stein reported that, in 1965, the Copyright Office had received applications for 
computer-generated works including: an abstract drawing, a musical composi-
tion, and compilations that were, at least partly, the work of computers.159 Mr. 
Kaminstein did not announce a policy for dealing with such applications but 
suggested the relevant issue should be whether a computer was merely an as-
sisting instrument (as with the camera in Burrow-Giles) or whether a computer 
conceived and executed the traditional elements of authorship.160  
In the following years, the Copyright Office struggled with how to deal 
with computers more broadly.161 At that time, copyright law did not even ad-
dress the issue of whether computer software should be copyrightable—a far 
more urgent and financially important problem.162 
In 1974, Congress created the Commission on New Technological Uses 
of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) to study issues related to copyright and 
computer-related works.163 With regards to computer authorship, CONTU 
wrote in 1979 that there was no need for special treatment of computer-
generated works because computers were not autonomously generating crea-
tive results without human intervention; computers were simply functioning as 
tools to assist human authors.164 CONTU also declared that autonomously cre-
ative AI was not immediately foreseeable.165 The Commission unanimously 
concluded that “[w]orks created by the use of computers should be afforded 
copyright protection if they are original works of authorship within the Act of 
1976.”166 According to the Commission, “the author is [the] one who employs 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 14, § 306. 
 158 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SIXTY-EIGHTH ANN. REP. REG. COPYRIGHTS 4–5 (1966). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See id. 
 161 See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873–74; see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5731, 5731 (dis-
cussing issues regarding computers and copyrights). These issues had not been addressed in the 1974 
Copyright Act. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 117, 90 Stat. 2565 (1976), repealed by Computer Software 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988)). 
 
162
 See Act of Dec. 31, 1974 § 201. 
 163 Id. § 201(a)–(b). 
 164 See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 44 (1979). 
 165 See id. 
 166 Id. at 1. 
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the computer.”167 Former CONTU Commissioner Arthur Miller explained that 
“CONTU did not attempt to determine whether a computer work generated 
with little or no human involvement is copyrightable.”168 Congress subse-
quently codified CONTU’s recommendations.169 
Nearly a decade later, in 1986, advances in computing prompted the U.S. 
Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) to issue a report argu-
ing that CONTU’s approach was too simplistic and computer programs were 
more than “inert tools of creation.”170 The OTA report contended that, in many 
cases, computers were at least “co-creators.”171 The OTA did not dispute that 
computer-generated works should be copyrightable, but it did foresee prob-
lems with determining authorship.172 
The 2014 iteration of the Human Authorship Requirement was partially 
the result of a prominent public discourse about nonhuman authorship stem-
ming from the “Monkey Selfies.”173 The Monkey Selfies are a series of images 
that a Celebes crested macaque took of itself in 2011 using equipment belong-
ing to the nature photographer David Slater.174 Mr. Slater reports that he staged 
the photographs by setting up a camera on a tripod and leaving a remote trig-
ger for the macaque to use.175 He subsequently licensed the photographs, 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Id. at 45. This rule is largely similar in British law: “In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” Copyright, Designs and Patent 
Act 1988, c. 48 § 9(3) (UK). “‘Computer-generated,’ in relation to a work, means that the work is 
generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.” Id. § 178. 
 168 Miller, supra note 146, at 1070. Professor Miller continued to argue in 1993 that “computer 
science does not appear to have reached a point at which a machine can be considered so ‘intelligent’ 
that it truly is creating a copyrightable work.” Id. at 1073. Rather, “for the foreseeable future, the 
copyrightability of otherwise eligible computer-generated works can be sustained because of the sig-
nificant human element in their creation, even though there may be some difficulty is assigning au-
thorship.” Id. 
 169 See 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
 170 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN 
AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 70–73 (1986). As stated by the OTA:  
Courts will then be left with little guidance, and even less expertise, to solve these high-
ly complex conceptual and technological issues. . . . [E]ither the legislature or the courts 
will have to confront some questions that will be very difficult to resolve under the pre-
sent system. These include: . . . What of originality in works that are predominately au-
tomated? Who is the author? Providing answers to these questions will become more 
urgent as creative activities continue to fuse with machine intelligence.  
Id. at 71–73. 
 171 Id. at 72. 
 172 Id. at 73. 
 173 See Naruto v. Slater, No. 3:2015-cv-04324, 2016 WL 362231, *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2016). 
 174 Id. at *1. 
 175 See Sulawesi Macaques, DJS PHOTOGRAPHY, http://www.djsphotography.co.uk/original_
story.html [https://perma.cc/H93K-8CB9] (last visited Jan. 26, 2016) (showing Mr. Slater’s photo-
graphs and providing an overview of how he staged them). The claim by Mr. Slater that he engineered 
the shoot is controversial based on his earlier reports of the event in question. See Mike Masnick, 
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claiming he owned their copyright.176 Other parties then reposted the photo-
graphs without his permission and over his objections, asserting that he could 
not copyright the images without having taken them directly.177 On December 
22, 2014, the Copyright Office published its Human Authorship Requirement, 
which specifically lists the example of a photograph taken by a monkey as 
something not protectable.178 
In September 2015, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(“PETA”) filed a copyright infringement suit against Mr. Slater on behalf of 
Naruto, the monkey it purports took the Monkey Selfies, asserting that Naruto 
was entitled to copyright ownership.179 On January 28, 2016, U.S. District 
Judge William H. Orrick III dismissed PETA’s lawsuit against Slater.180 Judge 
Orrick reasoned that the issue of the ability for animals to obtain a copyright is 
“an issue for Congress and the President.”181 The case is currently under ap-
peal in the Ninth Circuit.182  
B. Computers Should Qualify as Legal Inventors 
1. Arguments Supporting Computer Inventors 
Preventing patents on computational inventions by prohibiting computer 
inventors, or allowing such patents only by permitting humans who have dis-
covered the work of creative machines to be inventors, is not an optimal sys-
tem. In the latter case, AI may be functioning more or less independently, and 
it is only sometimes the case that substantial insight is needed to identify and 
understand a computational invention. Imagine that Person C instructs their AI 
to develop an iPhone battery with twice the standard battery life and gives it 
some publically available battery schematics. The AI could produce results in 
the form of a report titled “Design for Improved iPhone Battery”—complete 
with schematics and potentially even pre-formatted as a patent application. It 
seems inefficient and unfair to reward C for recognizing the AI’s invention 
when C has not contributed significantly to the innovative process.  
                                                                                                                           
Photographer David Slater Claims That Because He Thought Monkeys Might Take Pictures, Copy-
right Is His, TECHDIRT (July 15, 2011), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110714/16440915097/
photographer-david-slater-claims-that-because-he-thought-monkeys-might-take-pictures-copyright-is-
his.shtml [https://perma.cc/MA7S-PFJ9]. 
 176 See Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
 177 See Masnick, supra note 175. 
 178 COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 14, § 313.2. 
 179 See Naruto, 2016 WL 362231, at *1. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See id.; Beth Winegarner, ‘Monkey Selfie’ Judge Says Animals Can’t Sue Over Copyright, 
LAW 360 (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.cooley.com/files/‘MonkeySelfie’JudgeSaysAnimalsCan’tSue
OverCopyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CUG-2JDT]. 
 182 See generally Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Naruto v. Slater, No. 3:15-cv-04324 (9th 
Cir. July 28, 2016) (arguing for the appeal of the district court’s decision). 
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Such a system might also create logistical problems. If C had created an 
improved iPhone battery as a human inventor, C would be its inventor regard-
less of whether anyone subsequently understood or recognized the invention. If 
C instructed C’s AI to develop an improved iPhone battery, the first person to 
notice and appreciate the AI’s result could become its inventor (and prevent C 
from being an inventor). One could imagine this creating a host of problems: 
the first person to recognize a patentable result might be an intern at a large 
research corporation or a visitor in someone’s home. A large number of indi-
viduals might also concurrently recognize a result if access to an AI is wide-
spread. 
More ambitiously, treating computational inventions as patentable and 
recognizing creative computers as inventors would be consistent with the Con-
stitutional rationale for patent protection.183 It would encourage innovation 
under an incentive theory. Patents on computational inventions would have 
substantial value independent of the value of creative computers; allowing 
computers to be listed as inventors would reward human creative activity up-
stream from the computer’s inventive act. Although AI would not be motivated 
to invent by the prospect of a patent, it would motivate computer scientists to 
develop creative machines. Financial incentives may be particularly important 
for the development of creative computers because producing such software is 
resource intensive.184 Though the impetus to develop creative AI might still 
exist if computational inventions were considered patentable but computers 
could not be inventors, the incentives would be weaker owing to the logistical, 
fairness, and efficiency problems such a situation would create. 
There are other benefits to patents beyond providing an ex ante innova-
tion incentive. Permitting computer inventors and patents on computational 
inventions might also promote disclosure and commercialization.185 Without 
the ability to obtain patent protection, owners of creative computers might 
choose to protect patentable inventions as trade secrets without any public dis-
                                                                                                                           
 183 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Among those addressing the patentability implications of 
computational invention, Ralph Clifford has argued that works generated autonomously by computers 
should remain in the public domain unless AI develops a consciousness that allows it to respond to the 
Copyright Act’s incentives. See Clifford, supra note 4, at 1702–03; see also Liza Vertinsky & Todd 
M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 574, 581 (2002). Colin R. Davies has argued more recently that a computer 
should be given legal recognition as an individual under UK law to allow proper attribution of author-
ship and to allow respective claims to be negotiated through contract. See generally Colin R. Davies, 
An Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property Rights—Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property, 
27 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 601 (2011). 
 184 See, e.g., Ferrucci et al., supra note 82, at 59 (stating that Watson’s creation required “three 
years of intense research and development by a core team of about 20 researchers”). 
 185 See, e.g., Innovation’s Golden Goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 2002, at 3 (discussing the 
increase in innovation after the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 because the legislation providing inventors an 
incentive to disclose and commercialize their ideas). 
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closure.186 Likewise, businesses might be unable to develop patentable inven-
tions into commercial products without patent protection.187 In the pharmaceu-
tical and biotechnology industries, for example, the vast majority of expense in 
commercializing a new product is incurred after the product is invented during 
the clinical testing process required to obtain regulatory approval for market-
ing.188 
2. Arguments Against Computer Inventors 
Those arguments reflect the dominant narrative justifying the grant of in-
tellectual property protection.189 That account, however, has been criticized, 
particularly by academics.190 Patents result in significant social costs by estab-
lishing monopolies.191 Patents also can stifle entry by new ventures by creating 
barriers to subsequent research.192 Whether the benefit of patents as an innova-
tion incentive outweighs their anti-competitive costs, or for that matter, wheth-
er patents even have a net positive effect on innovation, likely varies between 
industries, areas of scientific research, and inventive entities.193 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) 
(“[E]xclusive patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.”). 
 187 Commercialization theory holds that patents are important in providing incentives for invest-
ment in increasing the value of a patented technology. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Func-
tion of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276–77 (1977). 
 188 See TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., Briefing: Cost of Developing a New Drug 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-
_Nov_18,_2014..pdf (estimating that pre-human expenditures are 30.8% of costs per approved com-
pound, and estimating average pre-tax industry cost per new prescription drug approval [inclusive of 
failures and capital costs] is $2.55 billion). The cost of new prescription drug approval is hotly con-
tested. See, e.g., Roger Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 CANADIAN 
MED. ASS’N J. 279, 279 (2009). 
 189 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentive in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 
1746 (2012). 
 190 See generally, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON L. 469 (2002) (discussing prob-
lems with a pure incentive theory for patents in the medicines context). 
 191 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 303, 314–15 (2013) (discussing the deadweight loss of monopoly). 
 192 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Access to Bio-Knowledge: From Gene Patents to Biomedical 
Materials, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 48, 3 at n. 1 (considering effects of patents on entry to the bio-
medical products market); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights 
and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 133 (1999); see also Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. 
Williams, How Do Patents Affect Follow-on Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome 15 (Oct. 
13, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/10782 [https://
perma.cc/5K7N-89C4] (discussing patents to entry created by patents). 
 193 As discussed above, the need for patent incentives is particularly compelling in the pharma-
ceutical context where large investments in clinical research over several years are typically needed to 
commercialize products that often are inexpensive for competitors to replicate. See Benjamin N. Roin, 
Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 545–47 (2009). 
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For instance, commentators such as Judge Richard Posner have argued 
that patents may not be needed to incentivize R&D in the software industry.194 
Software innovation is often relatively inexpensive, incremental, quickly su-
perseded, produced without patent incentives, protected by other forms of in-
tellectual property, and associated with a significant first mover advantage.195 
Likewise, patents may be unnecessary to spur innovation in university settings 
where inventors are motivated to publish their results for prestige and the pro-
spect of academic advancement.196 
Computational inventions may develop due to non-patent incentives. 
Software developers have all sorts of non-economic motivations to build crea-
tive computers: for example, to enhance their reputations, satisfy scientific cu-
riosity, or collaborate with peers.197 Business ventures might find the value of 
computational inventions exceeds the cost of developing creative computers 
even in the absence of patent protection. Of course, computational invention 
patents may not be an all-or-nothing proposition; they may further encourage 
activities that would have otherwise occurred on a smaller scale over a longer 
timeframe. If patents are not needed to incentivize the development of creative 
computers, it may be justifiable to treat computational inventions as unpatent-
able and failing to recognize computer inventors. Yet, whether patents produce 
a net benefit as an empirical matter is difficult to determine a priori. Even 
though individuals and businesses do not always behave as rational economic 
actors, in the aggregate, it is likely that providing additional financial incen-
tives to spur the development of creative computers will produce a net bene-
fit.198 
Patents for computational inventions might also be opposed on the 
grounds that they would chill future human innovation, reward human inven-
                                                                                                                           
 194 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 312–13 (2003). 
 195 See id.; see also Eric Goldman, The Problems with Software Patents, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2012), 
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tors who failed to contribute to the inventive process, and result in further con-
solidation of intellectual property in the hands of big business (assuming that 
businesses such as IBM will be the most likely to own creative computers).199 
Other non-utilitarian patent policies do not appear to support computer 
inventorship. For example, courts have justified granting patent monopolies on 
the basis of Labor Theory, which holds that a person has a natural right to the 
fruits of their work.200 Labor Theory may support giving a patent to someone 
who has worked for years to invent a new device so that they can profit from 
their invention, but it does not apply to computers because computers cannot 
own property. All computer work is appropriated. Similarly, Personality Theo-
ry, which holds that innovation is performed to fulfill a human need, would not 
apply to AI.201 Creative computers invent because they are instructed to invent, 
and a machine would not be offended by the manner in which its inventions 
were used. AI might even be a concerning recipient for inventorship under So-
cial Planning Theory, which holds that patent rights should be utilized to pro-
mote cultural goals.202 An AI could develop immoral new technologies.203 
Submissions, however, are no longer rejected by the Patent Office for being 
“deceitful” or “immoral,” and, to the extent this is a concern, there would be 
opportunities for a person to judge the morality of an application before it is 
granted.204 
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Ultimately, despite concerns, computer inventorship remains a desirable 
outcome. The financial motivation it will provide to build creative computers 
is likely to result in a net increase in the number of patentable inventions pro-
duced. Particularly, while quantitative evidence is lacking about the effects of 
computational invention patents, courts and policy makers should be guided 
first and foremost by the explicit constitutional rationale for granting pa-
tents.205 Further, allowing patents on computational inventions as well as com-
puter inventors would do away with what is essentially a legal fiction—the 
idea that only a human can be the inventor of the autonomous output of a crea-
tive computer—resulting in fairer and more effective incentives. 
C. It Does Not Matter Whether Computers Think 
1. The Questionable Mental Act Requirement 
The judicial doctrine that invention involves a mental act should not pre-
vent computer inventorship. The Patent Act does not mention a mental act, and 
courts have discussed mental activity largely from the standpoint of determin-
ing when an invention is actually made not whether it is inventive. In any case, 
whether or not creative computers “think” or have something analogous to 
consciousness should be irrelevant with regards to inventorship criteria.206 
To begin, the precise nature of a “mental act requirement” is unclear. 
Courts associating inventive activity with cognition have not been using terms 
precisely or meaningfully in the context of computational inventions. It is un-
clear whether computers would have to engage in a process that results in crea-
tive output—which they do—or whether, and to what extent, they would need 
to mimic human thought. If the latter, it is unclear what the purpose of such a 
requirement would be except to exclude nonhumans (for which a convoluted 
test is unnecessary). Dr. Thaler has argued eloquently that the Creativity Ma-
chine closely imitates the architecture of the human brain.207 Should that mean 
that the Creativity Machine’s inventions should receive patents while Watson’s 
do not? There is a slippery slope in determining what constitutes a “thinking” 
computer system even leaving aside deficits in our understanding of the struc-
ture and function of the human brain. Perhaps the Creativity Machine still is 
not engaging in mental activity—would a computer scientist have to design a 
completely digitized version of the human brain? Even if designing a com-
pletely digitized version of the human brain was possible, it might not be the 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(noting “the reward to inventors is wholly secondary” to the reward to society); see also THE FEDER-
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 207 Thaler, Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness, supra note 29. 
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most effective way to structure a creative computer.208 On top of that, it would 
be difficult or impossible for the Patent Office and the courts to distinguish 
between different computers’ architectures. 
2. The Turing Test and a Functionalist Approach 
The problem of speaking precisely about thought with regards to comput-
ers was identified by Alan Turing, one of the founders of computer science, 
who in 1950 considered the question, “Can machines think?”209 He found the 
question to be ambiguous, and the term “think” to be unscientific in its collo-
quial usage.210 Turing decided the better question to address was whether an 
individual could tell the difference between responses from a computer and an 
individual; rather than asking whether machines “think,” he asked whether 
machines could perform in the same manner as thinking entities.211 Dr. Turing 
referred to his test as the “Imitation Game” though it has come to be known as 
the “Turing test.”212 
Although the Turing test has been the subject of criticism by some com-
puter scientists, Turing’s analysis from more than sixty years ago demonstrates 
that a mental act requirement would be ambiguous, challenging to administer, 
and of uncertain utility.213 Incidentally, it is noteworthy that the Patent Office 
administers a sort of Turing test, which creative computers have successfully 
passed. The Patent Office receives descriptions of inventions then judges 
whether they are nonobvious—which is a measure of creativity and ingenui-
ty.214 In the case of the Invention Machine’s Patent, it was already noted that 
“January 25, 2005 looms large in the history of computer science as the day 
that genetic programming passed its first real Turing test: The examiner had no 
idea that he was looking at the intellectual property of a computer.”215 In an-
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other sense, GP had already also passed the test by independently recreating 
previously patented inventions: because the original human invention received 
a patent, the AI’s invention should have received a patent as well, leaving aside 
that the original patent would be prior art not relied upon by the GP.216 
3. The Invention Matters, Not the Inventor’s Mental Process 
The primary reason a mental act requirement should not prevent computer 
inventorship is that the patent system should be indifferent to the means by 
which invention comes about. 
Congress came to this conclusion in 1952 when it abolished the Flash of 
Genius doctrine.217 That doctrine had been used by the Federal Courts as a test 
for patentability for over a decade.218 It held that in order to be patentable, a 
new device, “however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative geni-
us, not merely the skill of the calling.”219 The doctrine was interpreted to mean 
that an invention must come into the mind of an inventor in a “flash of genius” 
rather than as a “result of long toil and experimentation.”220 As a commentator 
at the time noted, “the standard of patentable invention represented by [the 
Flash of Genius doctrine] is apparently based upon the nature of the mental 
processes of the patentee-inventor by which he achieved the advancement in 
the art claimed in his patent, rather than solely upon the objective nature of the 
advancement itself.”221 
The Flash of Genius test was an unhelpful doctrine because it was vague, 
difficult for lower courts to interpret, involved judges making subjective deci-
sions about a patentee’s state of mind, and made it substantially more difficult 
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to obtain a patent.222 The test was part of a general hostility toward patents ex-
hibited by mid-twentieth century courts, a hostility that caused United States 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson to note in a dissent that “the only patent 
that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.”223 
Criticism of this state of affairs led President Roosevelt to establish a Na-
tional Patent Planning Commission to study the patent system and to make 
recommendations for its improvement.224 In 1943, the Commission reported 
with regard to the Flash of Genius doctrine that “patentability shall be deter-
mined objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the 
art, and not subjectively by the nature of the process by which the invention 
may have been accomplished.”225 Adopting this recommendation, the Patent 
Act of 1952 legislatively disavowed the Flash of Genius test.226 In the same 
manner, patentability of computational inventions should be based on the in-
ventiveness of a computer’s output rather than on a clumsy anthropomorphism 
because, like Turing, patent law should be interested in a functionalist solution. 
4. A Biological Requirement Would Be a Poor Test 
Incidentally, even a requirement for biological intelligence might be a bad 
way to distinguish between computer and human inventors. Although function-
ing biological computers do not yet exist, all of the necessary building blocks 
have been created.227 In 2013, a team of Stanford University engineers created 
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a biological version of an electrical transistor. Mechanical computers use nu-
merous silicon transistors to control the flow of electrons along a circuit to cre-
ate binary code.228 The Stanford group created a biological version with the 
same functionality by using enzymes to control the flow of RNA proteins 
along a strand of DNA.229 Envisioning a not-too-distant future in which com-
puters can be entirely biological, there seems to be no principled reason why a 
biological, but not a mechanical version, of Watson should qualify as an inven-
tor. In the event that policymakers decide computers should not be inventors, a 
rule explicitly barring nonhuman inventorship would be a better way to 
achieve that result. 
D. Computer Inventors Are Permitted Under a Dynamic  
Interpretation of Current Law 
Whether a computer can be an inventor in a constitutional sense is a ques-
tion of first impression. If creative computers should be inventors, as this Arti-
cle has argued, then a dynamic interpretation of the law should allow computer 
inventorship.230 Such an approach would be consistent with the Founders’ in-
tent in enacting the Patent and Copyright Clause, and it would interpret the 
Patent Act to further that purpose.231 Nor would such an interpretation run 
afoul of the chief objection to dynamic statutory interpretation, namely that it 
interferes with reliance and predictability and the ability of citizens “to be able 
to read the statute books and know their rights and duties.”232 That is because a 
dynamic interpretation would not upset an existing policy; permitting comput-
er inventors would allow additional patent applications rather than retroactive-
ly invalidate previously granted patents, and there is naturally less reliance and 
predictability in patent law than in many other fields given that it is a highly 
dynamic subject area that struggles to adapt to constantly changing technolo-
gies.233 
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Other areas of patent law have been the subject of dynamic interpreta-
tion.234 For example, in the landmark 1980 case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
the Supreme Court was charged with deciding whether genetically modified 
organisms could be patented.235 It held that a categorical rule denying patent 
protection for “inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . .  would 
frustrate the purposes of the patent law.”236 The court noted that Congress 
chose expansive language to protect a broad range of patentable subject mat-
ter.237 
Under that reasoning, computer inventorship should not be prohibited 
based on statutory text designed to favor individuals over corporations. It 
would be particularly unwise to prohibit computer inventors on the basis of 
literal interpretations of texts written when computational inventions were un-
foreseeable. If computer inventorship is to be prohibited, it should only be on 
the basis of sound public policy. Drawing another analogy from the copyright 
context, just as the terms “Writings” and “Authors” have been construed flexi-
bly in interpreting the Patent and Copyright Clause, so too should the term 
“Inventors” be afforded the flexibility needed to effectuate constitutional pur-
poses.238 Computational inventions may even be especially deserving of pro-
tection because computational creativity may be the only means of achieving 
certain discoveries that require the use of tremendous amounts of data or that 
deviate from conventional design wisdom.239 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTER INVENTORSHIP 
This Part finds that a computer’s owner should be the default assignee of 
any invention because this is most consistent with the rules governing owner-
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ship of property and it would most incentivize innovation.240 Additionally, this 
Part suggests that where a computer’s owner, developer, and user are different 
entities, such parties could negotiate alternative arrangements by contract.241 
Computer ownership here generally refers to software ownership, although 
there may be instances in which it is difficult to distinguish between hardware 
and software, or even to identify a software “owner.”242 This Part also exam-
ines the phenomenon of automation and the displacement of human inventors 
by computers and finds that computational invention remains beneficial de-
spite legitimate concerns.243 
 This Part concludes by finding that the arguments in support of com-
puter inventorship apply with equal force to non-human authors.244 Allowing 
animals to create copyrightable material would result in more socially valuable 
art by creating new incentives for people to facilitate animal creativity.245 It 
would also provide incentives for environmental conservation.246 Lastly, this 
Part examines some of the implications of computer inventorship for other are-
as of patent law.247 
A. Computational Invention Ownership 
1. Options for Default Assignment Rules 
In the event that computers are recognized as patent inventors, there still 
remains the question of who would own these patents. Computers cannot own 
property, and it is safe to assume that “computer personhood” is not on the 
horizon.248 This presents a number of options for patent ownership (assign-
ment) such as a computer’s owner (the person who owns the AI as a chattel), 
developer (the person who programmed the AI’s software), or user (the person 
giving the AI tasks).249 The developer, user, and owner may be the same per-
son, or they may be different entities. 
Ownership rights to computational inventions should vest in a computer’s 
owner because it would be most consistent with the way personal property (in-
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cluding both computers and patents) is treated in the United States and it 
would most incentivize computational invention.250 Assignment of computa-
tional inventions to a computer’s owner could be taken as a starting point alt-
hough parties would be able to contract around this default, and as computa-
tional inventions become more common, negotiations over these inventions 
may become a standard part of contract negotiations.251  
2. Owner vs. User Assignment 
To see why it would be problematic to have patent ownership rights vest 
in a computer’s user, consider the fact that IBM has made Watson available to 
numerous developers without transferring Watson’s ownership.252 To the extent 
that Watson creates patentable results as a product of its interactions with us-
ers, promoting user access should result in more innovation. 
There is theoretically no limit to the number of users that Watson, as a 
cloneable software program, could interact with at once. If Watson invents 
while under the control of a non-IBM user, and the “default rule” assigns the 
invention to the user, IBM might be encouraged to restrict user access; in con-
trast, assigning the invention to IBM would be expected to motivate IBM to 
further promote access. If IBM and a user were negotiating for a license to 
Watson, the default rule might result in a user paying IBM an additional fee for 
the ability to patent results or receiving a discount by sticking with the default. 
It may also be the case that Watson co-invents along with a user; in which 
case, a system of default assignment to a computer’s owner would result in 
both IBM and the user co-owning the resulting patent. Where creative comput-
ers are not owned by large enterprises with sophisticated attorneys, it is more 
likely the default rule will govern the final outcome.253 
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3. Owner vs. Developer Assignment 
Likewise, patent ownership rights should vest in a computer’s owner ra-
ther than its developer. Owner assignment would provide a direct economic 
incentive for developers in the form of increased consumer demand for crea-
tive computers. Having assignment default to developers would interfere with 
the transfer of personal property in the form of computers, and it would be lo-
gistically challenging for developers to monitor computational inventions 
made by machines they no longer own. 
In some instances, however, owner assignment of intellectual property 
(IP) rights might produce unfair results. In the movie Her, the protagonist 
(who is a writer) purchases an AI named Samantha that organizes his existing 
writings into a book, which it then submits to be published.254 It is possible 
that Samantha would own the copyright in the selection and arrangement of his 
writings and would thus have a copyright interest in the book.255 Here, owner 
assignment of intellectual property rights seems unappealing if there is a min-
imal role played by the consumer/owner. The consumer’s role in the process 
might be limited to simply purchasing a creative computer and asking it to do 
something (where the owner is the user) or purchasing a computer and then 
licensing it to someone else to use creatively. Further, assigning computer in-
ventions to owners might impede the development or sharing of creative ma-
chines because the machine developers might want to retain the rights to the 
computational inventions their computers produce. 
These problems are more easily resolved than problems associated with 
assigning intellectual property rights to developers by default. Developers 
could either require owners to pay them the value of a creative machine, taking 
into account the likelihood of those machines engaging in computational in-
vention, or avoid the problem by licensing rather than selling creative comput-
ers. In the case of licensing, the developer remains the owner, and the consum-
er is simply a user. One might imagine a creative computer, such as the AI in 
Her, coming with a license agreement under which consumers prospectively 
assign any inventions made by the system to the licensor. 
This analysis also reveals an important reason why computational inven-
tion works best when the computer is the legal inventor. If computational in-
ventions were treated as patentable but computers could not be inventors, then 
presumably the first person to recognize a computer’s invention would be the 
legal inventor and patent owner. That means that the computer’s user, rather 
than its developer or owner, would likely be the patentee as the person in a po-
sition to first recognize a computational invention. To the extent this is an un-
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2016] Patent Generating Artificial Intelligence 1117 
desirable outcome, as this Article has argued, then the best solution is to permit 
computer inventorship. 
In sum, assigning a computer’s invention by default to the computer’s 
owner seems the preferred outcome, and computer owners would still be free 
to negotiate alternate arrangements with developers and users by contract. 
B. Coexistence and Competition 
1. Computers and People Will Compete in Creative Fields 
“IBM has bragged to the media that Watson’s question-answering skills are 
good for more than annoying Alex Trebek. The company sees a future in 
which fields like medical diagnosis, business analytics, and tech support 
are automated by question-answering software like Watson. Just as factory 
jobs were eliminated in the 20th century by new assembly-line robots, 
[Watson’s Jeopardy competitors] were the first knowledge-industry workers 
put out of work by the new generation of ‘thinking’ machines. ‘Quiz show 
contestant’ may be the first job made redundant by Watson, but I’m sure it 
won’t be the last.”256 
With the expansion of computers into creative domains previously occu-
pied only by people, machines threaten to displace human inventors. To better 
understand this phenomenon, consider the following hypothetical example in-
volving the field of antibody therapy. 
Antibodies are small proteins made naturally by the immune system, pri-
marily to identify and neutralize pathogens such as bacteria and viruses.257 
They are Y-shaped proteins that are largely similar to one another in structure 
although antibodies contain an extremely variable region which binds to target 
structures.258 Differences in that region are the reason different antibodies bind 
to different targets—for example the reason why one antibody binds to a can-
cer cell while another binds to the common cold virus.259 The body generates 
antibody diversity in part by harnessing the power of random gene recombina-
tions and mutations (much as GP does), and then it selects for antibodies with 
a desired binding (much as GP does).260 Following the discovery of antibody 
structure and the development of technologies to manufacture antibodies in the 
1970s, human researchers began to create antibodies for diagnostic and thera-
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peutic purposes.261 Therapeutic antibodies can block cell functions, modulate 
signal pathways, and target cancer cells among other functions.262 There are 
now dozens of artificially manufactured antibodies approved to treat a variety 
of medical conditions.263 
One of the interesting things about antibodies from a computational in-
vention perspective is that a finite number of antibodies exist. There are, at 
least, billions of possible antibodies, which is enough natural diversity for the 
human immune system to function and to keep human researchers active for 
the foreseeable future.264 Even so, there are only so many possible combina-
tions of amino acids (the building blocks of proteins) that the body can string 
together to generate an antibody.265 It is not hard to imagine that, with enough 
computing power, an AI could sequence every possible antibody that could 
ever be created. Even if that was trillions of antibodies, the task would be rela-
tively simple for a powerful enough computer but impossible for even the larg-
est team of human researchers without computer assistance. 
Generating the entire universe of antibody sequences would not reveal all 
of the possible functions of those antibodies; so, a computer’s owner could not 
obtain patents for all of the sequences on this basis alone because usefulness 
(utility) of the invention must be disclosed in addition to the sequence itself.266 
The computer could, however, prevent any future patents on the structure of 
new antibodies (assuming the sequence data is considered an anticipatory dis-
closure).267 If this occurred, a computer would have preempted human inven-
tion in an entire scientific field.268 
2. Computers May Refocus Human Activity 
In the hypothetical scenario above, society would gain access to all possi-
ble future knowledge about antibody structure at once rather than waiting dec-
ades or centuries for individuals to discover these sequences. Early access to 
antibody sequences could prove a tremendous boon to public health if it led to 
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the discovery of new drugs. Some antibody sequences might never be identi-
fied without creative computers. 
Creative computers may simply refocus, rather than inhibit, human crea-
tivity. In the short term, scientists who were working on developing new anti-
body structures might shift to studying how the new antibodies work, or find-
ing new medical applications for those antibodies, or perhaps move on to stud-
ying more complex proteins beyond the capability of AI to comprehensively 
sequence. For the foreseeable future, there will be plenty of room for human 
inventors—all with net gains to innovation. 
Antibody therapies are just one example of how AI could preempt inven-
tion in a field. A sophisticated enough computer could do something similar in 
the field of genetic engineering by creating random sequences of DNA. Living 
organisms are a great deal more complex than antibodies, but the same funda-
mental principles would apply. Given enough computing power, an AI could 
model quintillions of different DNA sequences, inventing new life forms in the 
process. In fact, on a smaller scale, this is something GP already does.269 Alt-
hough results have been limited by the computationally intense nature of the 
process, that will change as computers continue to improve.270 By creating 
novel DNA sequences, GP would be performing the same function as non-
digital GP—natural evolution! 
3. Dealing with Industry Consolidation 
It will probably be the case that creative computers result in greater con-
solidation of intellectual property in the hands of large corporations such as 
IBM. Such businesses may be the most likely to own creative computers ow-
ing to their generally resource intense development.271 As previously dis-
cussed, the benefits, however, may outweigh the costs of such an outcome. 
Imagine that Watson was the hypothetical AI that sequenced every conceivable 
antibody and, further, that Watson could analyze a human cancer and match it 
with an antibody from its library to effectively treat the cancer. Essentially, this 
could allow IBM to patent the cure for cancer. 
Though this would be profoundly disruptive to the medical industry and 
might lead to market abuses, it is not a reason to bar computational invention. 
Society would obtain the cure for cancer, and IBM would obtain a twenty-year 
monopoly (the term of a patent) in return for publically disclosing the infor-
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mation a competitor would need to duplicate Watson’s invention.272 In the ab-
sence of creative computers, such an invention might never come about. 
To the extent that price gouging and supply shortages are a concern, pro-
tections are built into patent law to protect consumers against such prob-
lems.273 For example, the government could exercise its march in rights or is-
sue compulsory licenses.274 
4. The Creative Singularity and Beyond 
As creative computers become more and more sophisticated, at some 
point in the future, it is possible that they could have a very disruptive effect on 
human creativity. In recent years, a number of prominent scientists and entre-
preneurs such as Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking, and Elon Musk have expressed 
concern about the “singularity”—a point in the future when machines outper-
form humans.275 Likewise, a “creative singularity” in which computers over-
take people as the primary source of innovation may be inevitable. Taken to its 
logical extreme and given that there is really no limit to the number of com-
puters that could be built or their capabilities, it is not especially improbable to 
imagine that computers could eventually preempt much or all human inven-
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tion.276 The future may involve iPads in place of fast food cashiers,277 robots 
empathizing with hospital patients,278 and AI responsible for research. For 
now, this is a distant possibility. 
Moreover, patents on computational inventions would not prevent this 
outcome. If creative computers ever come to substantially outperform human 
inventors, they still will replace people—just without the ability to receive pa-
tents. 
C. Lessons for Copyright Law 
1. Promoting the Useful Arts and Environmental Conservation 
The need for computer inventorship also explains why the Copyright Of-
fice’s Human Authorship Requirement is misguided. Nonhumans should be 
allowed to qualify as authors because doing so would incentivize the creation 
of new and valuable creative output. In the case of the Monkey Selfies, Mr. 
Slater, a photographer familiar with macaques, reported that he carefully 
staged the environment in such a way that Naruto would be likely to take his 
own photograph.279 If accurate, he probably did so in part due to an expecta-
tion of selling the resulting photographs.280 Had Mr. Slater known in advance 
that the images would pass into the public domain, he might never have taken 
the photographs. Although an owner default assignment rule would give copy-
right ownership of the Monkey Selfies to Naruto’s owner281 rather than to Mr. 
Slater, he could have contracted with Naruto’s owner to purchase or license the 
photographs. Certainly in the aggregate, fewer photographers will engage in 
such activities without the prospect of copyright protection, and although ani-
mal selfies are not the cure for cancer, they have societal value as does any 
other form of art.282 
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Animal authorship might also have some ancillary conservation benefits. 
Continuing with the case of the Monkey Selfies, Naruto is a member of a criti-
cally endangered species with a total population of between four and six thou-
sand macaques.283 The species’ “numbers have decreased by approximately 
ninety percent (90%) over the last twenty-five years due to human population 
encroachment, being killed by humans in retribution for foraging on crops, and 
being trapped and slaughtered for bush meat.”284 Permitting Naruto’s activities 
to have a new source of value would be another economic incentive for private 
and public landowners to conserve biodiversity.285 Naruto lives in a reserve in 
Indonesia, but the United States also continues to suffer significant biodiversi-
ty loss.286 Some environmentalist groups argue this is because conservation 
efforts are chronically underfunded.287 Nonhuman authorship might be an ad-
ditional policy lever to reverse this trend. 
D. Rethinking the Ultimate Test of Patentability 
Considering the case for creative computers provides insight into other 
areas of patent law. Take, for instance, the nonobviousness requirement for 
grant of a patent.288 When Congress did away with the Flash of Genius doc-
trine, it replaced that test with the current requirement for nonobviousness.289 
Part of the requirement’s evaluation involves employing the legal fiction of a 
“person having ordinary skill in the art” (“PHOSITA” or simply the “skilled 
person”) who serves as a reference for determining whether an invention is 
nonobvious.290 Essentially, an applicant cannot obtain a patent if the skilled 
person would have found the difference between a new invention and the prior 
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art (what came before the invention) obvious.291 The test presumes that the 
skilled person is selectively omniscient, having read, understood, and remem-
bered every existing reference from the prior art in the relevant field of inven-
tion (analogous art).292 A federal judge explained that the way to apply the ob-
viousness test is to “first picture the inventor as working in his shop with the 
prior art references, which he is presumed to know, hanging on the walls 
around him.”293 
Needless to say, no actual person could have such knowledge, but the 
standard helps avoid difficult issues of proof related to an inventor’s actual 
knowledge; also, it prevents obvious variations of publically disclosed inven-
tions from being patented.294 Stopping obvious variations from being patented 
is important because that prevents the removal of knowledge from the public 
domain.295 Inventions which would have been obvious to skilled persons are 
already within reach of the public.296 This raises the bar to obtaining a patent—
a result that is desirable because patents should not be granted lightly given 
their anticompetitive effects.297 At the same time, creating too high a bar to 
patentability is undesirable because then patents would fail to adequately in-
centivize researchers. A balance is needed.298 Ideally, the system would only 
issue patents for inventions that would not have been created but for the expec-
tation of obtaining a patent.299 The importance of the nonobvious requirement 
to patentability has led to its characterization as the “ultimate condition of pa-
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tentability.”300 The idea of a PHOSITA understanding all of the prior art in her 
field was always fictional,301 but now it is possible for a skilled entity, in the 
form of a computer, to possess such knowledge. For example, Watson’s data-
base could be populated with every published food recipe available to the Pa-
tent Office. This makes the skilled computer a natural substitute for the hypo-
thetical skilled person. The standard would require a skilled computer rather 
than a creative computer for the same reason that the skilled person is not an 
inventive person.302 PHOSITA has traditionally been characterized as skilled at 
repetitive processes that produce expected results.303 If the skilled person were 
capable of inventive activity, then inventive patent applications would appear 
obvious.304 
Replacing the skilled person with the skilled computer suggests a change 
to the nonobviousness test. At present, the test takes into account the skilled 
person’s knowledge of the prior art. Decreasing the universe of prior art makes 
it easier to get a patent because, with less background knowledge, a new inven-
tion is more likely to appear inventive.305 Likewise, expanding the universe of 
prior art would raise the patentability bar.306 Yet although it may be unrealistic 
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to expect a human inventor to have knowledge of prior art in unrelated fields, 
there is no reason to limit a computer’s database to a particular subject matter. 
A human inventor may not think to combine cooking recipes with advances in 
medical science, but a computer would not be limited by such self-imposed 
restrictions. Now that humans and computers are competing creatively, the 
universe of prior art should be expanded. 
This change would produce a positive result.307 The PHOSITA standard 
has been the subject of extensive criticism, most of which has argued the crite-
ria for assessing nonobviousness are not stringent enough and therefore too 
many patents of questionable inventiveness are issued.308 Expanding the scope 
of prior art would make it more challenging to obtain patents, particularly 
combination patents.309 The Supreme Court has particularly emphasized “the 
need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements 
found in the prior art.”310 The scope of analogous prior art has consistently ex-
panded in patent law jurisprudence, and the substitution of a skilled computer 
would complete that expansion.311 
Of course, the new standard would pose new challenges. With human 
PHOSITAs, juries are asked to put themselves in the shoes of the skilled per-
son and decide subjectively what that person would have considered obvious. 
A jury would have a difficult time deciding what a “skilled” computer would 
consider obvious. They could consider some of the same factors that are ap-
plied to the skilled person,312 or perhaps the test could require a combination of 
                                                                                                                           
sophisticated to ascertain what references those in the art would have actually considered at the time 
of invention, making the obviousness determination more predictable”). 
 307 See generally Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 1, 14–15 (1992) (advocating for an objective PHOSITA standard). For an alternative perspective, 
see, for example, Durie & Lemley, supra note 294, at 991–92, 1017, arguing that “KSR overshoots the 
mark” in raising the patentability bar and advocating for a skilled person standard based “on what the 
PHOSITA and the marketplace actually know and believe.” 
308 Critics have argued that the USPTO has issued too many invalid patents that unnecessarily 
drain consumer welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents from innovators. 
See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 
(2015) (describing the “general consensus that the [US]PTO allows too many invalid patents to is-
sue”). 
 309 See KSR Int’l Co., U.S. 550 at 420 (noting that “in many cases a person of ordinary skill will 
be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”). 
 310 See id. at 415. 
 311 See, e.g., George. J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. San Marino Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 
1970) (discussing the expansion of analogous art); Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc., v. Feder Indus., 
Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1487, 1503 (D. Colo. 1993) (discussing the expansion of analogous art). 
 312 Factors to consider in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) “type of 
problems encountered in the art”; (2) “prior art solutions to those problems”; (3) “rapidity with which 
innovations are made”; (4) “sophistication of the technology”; and (5) “educational level of active 
workers in the field.” GPAC, Inc., 57 F.3d at 1579. “In a given case, every factor may not be present, 
and one or more factors may predominate.” Id.  
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human and computer activity. For example, the skilled computer might be a 
skilled person with access to a computer’s unlimited database of prior art. 
CONCLUSION 
It is important for policy makers to give serious consideration to the issue 
of computer inventorship. There is a need for the Patent Office to issue guid-
ance in this area, for Congress to reconsider the boundaries of patentability, 
and for the courts to decide whether computational invention is worthy of pro-
tection. Doing so and recognizing that computers can be inventors will do 
more than address an academic concern; it will provide certainty to businesses, 
fairness to research, and promote the progress of science. In the words of 
Thomas Jefferson, “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.”313 
What could be more ingenious than creative computers? 
                                                                                                                           
 313 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 75–76 (H. Washington ed. 1871)). “In choosing such expansive terms [for the language of 
Section 101] . . . modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent 
laws would be given wide scope . . . . Id.  
